First of all, I would like to express my appreciation for the victory the opposing side has won under General Biondo.
My personal assessment of the battle is ambivalent.
While my basic plan turned out to be a good approach, because the Allies expected a flank attack in the east due to a successful deception, there were some adversities in the implementation, which thwarted the prospect of success.
My plan was as follows:
- Advance to the main target of the Gerard Corps under Fabian and his Spanish generals
- After the expected takeover of the target point by the Allies, a line of attack SSW should be established
- The French guard was supposed to switch unnoticed in the south to the WNW after faking an eastern bypass, in order to launch a push attack on the allied right flank in the west.
- In preparation, the Gerard Corps should isolate and smash the upstream right flank of the Allies represented by Jakmin's Division in large numbers or force them back towards the center.
- The intended thrust attack by the guard should then be carried out surprisingly in the final third of the battle-time by advancing from WNW as close as possible to the target point without resistance.
The main adversities were as follows:
1. Unfortunately, Jakmin's division could not be fought as hoped, because Colbert's Dutch division may have exonerated Gerard's rights as ordered by Biondo. The losses of the French were very high at the beginning of the offensive.
2. Fabian's generals were able to throw Jakmin back, but less towards the center than much more north-northwest, which later prevented the Guard from advancing quickly.
3. A sufficient number of cavalry reserves had been kept in the northwestern rear area of the Allies, which further slowed the advance of the guard when trying to advance deeply into the allies right wing. Since the French Guard did not have its own mounted units, this could not be countered effectively.
4. The Guard's attack was not closed. The grenadiers under Neil and the chasseurs under my command were quite far apart. Neil's Clou could theoretically have been very successful, but Sargon's division was able to defend the back area in time due to the short distance from the left Allied flank. Additionally allied cavalry squadrons were also found here.
I may not have communicated with my generals precisely enough. In the beginning I recommended Fabian to use a BDE of cavalry to try to realize Jakmin's isolation. However, I did not suggest that the French cavalry be spared otherwise in order to fight the Allied cavalry or to support the most promising section for the main attack.
I was only informed about the positioning of the Allied cavalry when I myself advanced with Morand's division in the west. The order to command the French cavalry to support the guard may have come too late in the absence of adequate preparation time.
Perhaps I hadn't expressed myself clearly enough to Neil, who commanded Friant's Grenadiers and flanked very widely in the north. He had actually been instructed to flank to the left of my middle guard and to advance as far as possible towards the target point with little contact with the enemy, with the aim of pressing the already weakened allied right wing in an L-shape. The two conditions should actually be cumulative and not alternative.
Basically, with a limited battle-time of 3 hours, a complex bypass is often too time-consuming. However, the purely linear battle management is very monotonous in the long run and the softening of lines of approximately the same strength mostly also takes up a lot of time, even in the best case.
It is nevertheless very enriching to cooperate with so far not or little known, but very inspired generals, to learn from each other and to adapt to their individual peculiarities considering the different styles of communication.
Thanks for the shared experience!