In my opinion, the simplified scheme of the battle looked like this.
From this it is clear that the division (?) Of the French, who made a roundabout maneuver and a flank attack, was subjected to a dense counterattack.
Since the graphic is described as a
simplified presentation of the battel-lineup in an early phase of the battle, this and the so drawn conclusion was an applicable analysis made by General Herr Paulchen.
If I am informed correctly there were still parts of Praetoria´s Division on the far right, which arent displayed though.
To get a bit more precise in demonstrating the initial situation the following criteria are vital:
1. The French seized and occupied the objective and the area around, without any instant threatening by the Prussians.
2. The French had sufficiant time to deploy an adequate defence line-up.
3. The Prussian cavalry with more than 4000 horses significantly outnumbered the french with barely 1800 horsemen. Additionally most of the prussian divsions had at least 1-2 cavalry squadrons, while the french were concentrated in one Cav-Division of 2 brigades.
4. The French were fitted with 7 batteries of artillery, while the Prussians only could dispose 3 of those.
Conclusion:
While the Prussian force was predestined for conducting offensive maneuvres, the french side, in releation to the concrete opponent, was much more determined to defend.
Therefore the initial situation seemed to be promising for the French.
For me btw, its interesting to also have non-linear battles in force, since that is another aspect of immersion.
Analysis:
The french CiC Biondo remarked, that the french intelligence at this time didnt worked well, because he wasnt informed about the striking disproportion of cavalry of more than 1:2. In this case, the french cavarly only should have been brought into play to intercept direct enemy cavalry threats against the french infantry and striktly in close cooperation with it. To conduct engagements of pure cavalry vs. cavalry combat or using up the mobile forces against well prepared infantry, for the French side would inevitably lead to a situation of facing still strong enemy cavalry formations without the ability to dispose own fit for use horsemen. In Napoleonic Warfare such a constellation is actually always a clear factor for victory.
The initial situation for the French wasnt indicated to conduct any offensive maneuvres, unless there is a very clear opportunity to gain advantage from such.
Exactly this applied in the first phase of the battle on the W flank, respectively on the french left, where General Sandman deployed his infantry division:
1. The French outnumbered the opponent.
2. The French were overlapping the opponents line, so that they were enabled to outflank the Prussians.
3. At this end there was no prussian cavalry at all.
4. Also there wasnt any prussian artillery in the vinicity of the prussian far right.
5. The Prussians had no reserves on their right flank.
6. The prussian divisional commander fell due a heartattack or stroke in the wake of the deployment.
7. Perhaps parts of the prussian division were shifted away by the prussian CiC Asid who took over the command after the organic divisional leader fell.
When General Sandman realized the situation, he informed the french CiC Biondo about his plan trying to exploit from it by attacking the prussian flank and somewhat later has been authorized to do so. The Prussians chose the correct parade by sending skirmishers to delay the attack, while withdrawing the majortiy to the centre where 2 other prussian divisions with all kind of troops were depolyed. Since General Sandman did not command any cavalry squadron, it therefore was impossible to force the outer prussian division into engagements while outflanking it with his 2nd brigade.
The attack initially only was meant to become a temporary engagement to gain a possible benefit from a certain opportuinity. It wasnt intended to be a continious advance, because it wasnt neither promising nor nessecairy to advance to the prussian centre. After the Prussian Division fell back, the opportunity was gone and for the French, the right thing to do, actually was to redeploy backwards on the objective´s NNW.
What went wrong for the tricolore?
Probably General Sandman missed a deeper communication with CiC Biondo to inform him in time, that the enemy parried well by withdrawing to their centre and that General Sandman now tends to redeploy to the french line-up linking wtih the french centre to the left, then being able to defend the objective while Biondo supports General Colbert´s desperate defence against the prussian main attack in the east.
Perhaps CiC Biondo felt obliged to support General Sandman´s mistakenly supposed continious attack on the prussian centre. Therefore he sent cavalry to flank the alleged offence, but was intercepted and doomed to fail, since due a gap in the front it wasnt possible to directly ccoperate with Sandman´s force. Very soon he had to withdraw to support the already weakened General Colbert who faced strong prussian formations with numerous cavalry.
When General Sandman received CiC´s order to further pushing onto the enemy, he actually planned to redeploy as mentioned, but instead he followed according the order, because General Biondo´s engagement to support him relied on simultaneity.
After the offence couldnt kept up, General Sandman was isolated and now was outnumbered himself. He then had to fight a costly rearguard action against multible prussian infantry, several cavalry squadrons supported by a battery. In the end he formed a new defence line with his remaining 5 batallions and 4 cannons, but the enemy, now probably somewhat exhausted himself, disengaged to move to support the final prussian attack on the objective. For an instant Sandman was in vain confident to have bound enough enemies to relieve the defence at the objectiv.
When General Sandman´s remaining troops recovered a bit, he moved to support at the objective, but the battle was already decided. The prussians now dominated the perimeter of the strongpoint. There were no more remarkable french formations left. His only fairly conditioned force was intercepted by all kind of prussian troops and was forced to rout eternally.
During the first battle review, General Biondo also remarked, that the french heavy batteries´ deployment wasnt effective. He probably intended to use it for 2 major purposes:
1. Long range barrage of enemy lines
2. while occupying the objective at the same time.
Unfortunately the distance to the enemy was too large to weaken him adequately from an early stage on.
So did the Prussians automatically succeed because of several mistakes by the French?
Not at all! The Prussian commanders realzied their own strenghes and were able to exploit them by conducting the right maneuvres on the right places at the right time. They compensated the early loss of the notorious commander General Praetoria and gained a decesive victory, which was sealed impressively soon, when the french cavalry was mostly taken out and 1 french division was forced to isolation.
Hail to to Generals Asid, KlausVarna, Herr Paulchen and Praetoria.