Well, there are various levels of debunking. For example, the claim that Stalin had no defense plans only attack plans seems to be undisputed; what's disputed is what this implies. Everyone has attack plans, because those are easier than defense plans and attack (even in the case of the French Maginot Line) was the accepted military overall strategy typical of the time. That means there would be no special weight to Stalin having no defense plans per se, but it still counts as
some weight in regard to intentions, even if only a little. On the other hand, if it's true that Stalin's armies on and near the border were caught out of their excellent defensive revetments, in modes proper for the start of offensive deployment, then that would weigh pretty hard toward what a lack of a defensive plan means! (I mention this because of its relevance for how VictorR, who designed the DC series, explains his rationales for what's happening with the Soviets early in the Barbarossa game. The next question of course would be, how caught wound up to stab were the Russians?)
Along a similar line, I read/heard a recent criticism from the Military History Visualized guy quoting from a 2017 book critical of Suvorov's theory, where the author argued that Stalin wasn't ready to go in May, counting this against Suvorov's theory. But the author agreed that the evidence (which he claimed counted against Suv) did show decisively enough that Stalin DID intend to attack Hitler, just sometime in 42, presumably May 42 in time for prime campaigning weather. But Suvorov would agree that Stalin didn't think he could go in May, or he would have gone in May! That line of rebuttal says nothing about whether Stalin was keeping his options open to go in August, before he would be forced to demobilize his work force for harvest season. (It is of course a further question whether Stalin would risk another year without so much of his workforce in production, with both his guns drawn and ready to shoot as Suv likes to put it in lectures, instead of holstering them to build and eat etc. Had Stalin pulled the triggers in August he'd have still been pulling those triggers when harvest came after all, which he surely would have known. But maybe he thought he could raid the German harvests.)
On the other hand, it's harder to overlook some of Suvorov's convenient misquotes, like (to pull an example from the first link above of countercriticism) Hitler's supposed plan to plant reeds the following spring to make the next winter not so bad; when actually in his table talk Hitler was spitballing about the difficulty of making anything out of the conquered lands in peacetime even over centuries, the marshes of Pripyat being a key example. Suv presents this to show how ineptly stupid and crazy Hitler was. But then again his theory doesn't really hinge on Hitler's gross incompetence. It hinges, in the later stages of the theory, on quite the opposite: why would Hitler suddenly rush numerous army groups into big cold Russia this late in the year and gamble on taking out the Soviet Central Command (and that this would make enough difference to stop Russia from simply retrenching behind the Urals)? Because Hitler came to realize that Stalin intended to strike him soon. Why would Hitler realize that in that narrow window of time instead of just generally expecting it (due to Stalin being Stalin)? Something changed, and I recall Glantz in a lecture talking about another of Hitler's tabletop recordings where he was commenting dolefully on what his armies were finding in the early stages of Barbarossa: even more tanks being built than he himself had been expecting, upwards of 36 thousand in production near the German border. Hitler not only took this as confirmation that he had been right to pre-emptively invade, but as a bad sign that if he didn't finish Stalin off quickly the Germans would be screwed because there was no way he could stop them just starting up this hideous flood of overproduction again farther east where he'd never be able to get at it. (Which in the medium and long run is exactly what happened, although Hitler essentially forced Stalin to commit those forces in a more piecemeal fashion without as much training as would otherwise have been proper.)
So there are pros and cons to the debunking, too.
Suvorov has certainly suffered from some poor research and reporting in areas, and from more access to Soviet records, but he has adjusted since 1987, too.
(His concept of what counts as strategic design preparations for attack instead of defense seem kind of fluffy, too. Little tiny cannons on tanks mean attack intentions because they're sacrificing rifling and caliber weight for armored speed, or even for unarmored speed, but then giant heavy slow super-armored guns mean attack intentions because that's what you pull up to hit cities and forts with when you aren't worried about having to maneuver on defense which the heavy slow guns would suck at. But heavy defensive protective armor is inherently defensive and just look how great Soviet defensive armor was! -- uh, but useless in defense which is why they were abandoned!
At some point there I have to wonder what
would count in principle as evidence against his theory.)
Translations for our friends around the world.
Topic: JRP vs Barthheart vs DECISIVE CAMPAIGNS: BLITZKRIEG (Read 8648 times)
Similar topics (5)
January 25, 2018, 03:42:29 PM